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The Federal Role in Reducing Regulatory Barriers to
Affordable Housing in the Suburbs
by Michael H. Schill*
On July 8, 1991, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Jack
Kemp delivered to President Bush a report produced by the Advisory
Commission on Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing. The
report, entitled "Not In My Back Yard": Removing Barriers to Affordable
Housing,' concluded that suburbs have erected regulatory barriers to
housing for low and moderate income households and recommended a
series of actions to relax these restrictions. The Commission's judg-
ment is hardly surprising; since the late 1960s, a number of presidential
commissions have decried the exclusionary practices engaged in by
municipalities.2 What makes this report noteworthy is that it envisions
a fundamental role for the federal government in eliminating these bar-
riers. If the Commission's recommendations are enacted into law, the
federal government will, for the first time, deny certain forms of hous-
ing assistance to states that do not adopt barrier removal strategies.'
President Bush has incorporated the recommendations contained in
Not in My Back Yard into his 1993 budget proposals.4 These proposals
for the federal government to "crack down" on states and localities are
all the more significant when viewed in the context of the Bush Admin-
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. I would like to thank Seth Kreimer and
Stewart Sterk for their comments on an earlier draft.
I Advisory Commission on Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing, "Not in My Back
Yard": Removing Barriers to Affordable Housing (1991) [hereinafter Not In My Back Yard].
2 See, e.g., National Commission on Urban Problems, Building The American City 235
(1968) (urging action "to assure that local governments exercising regulatory authority are
responsive to the needs of broad segments of the population .... ); President's Commission
on Housing, The Report of the President's Commission on Housing 199 (1982) ("Excessive
restrictions on housing production have driven up the price of housing generally, damaging
the new housing market and the filtering process that makes older units available to families
seeking to 'move up' to more desirable accommodations."); President's Committee on Urban
Housing, A Decent Home 142 (1968) ("In many urban communities, the net effect of public
land policies is to reduce the supply of land available for modest-cost housing and thus to
increase its cost.").
3 See infra text accompanying notes 20-27.
4 Budget of the United States Fiscal Year 1993, 182-183 (1992).
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istration's professed belief that states and localities should be protected
from federal interference. 5 If the Commission's proposals are adopted,
the federal government will, for the first time, take an active role in
policing land use regulations, traditionally a function of local
governments.
The Commission's report includes surprisingly little discussion of
why the federal government should involve itself in regulations usually
left to local discretion. In addition, the report does not fully explain
one of its core assumptions - that members of Congress would be
more likely to restrain the exclusionary practices of suburban munici-
palities than state legislators. In this article, I address both of these
issues. In Part I, I briefly summarize the findings and recommenda-
tions of the Commission. In Part II, I show that under current doc-
trine, any constraints on the ability of Congress to limit or eliminate
restrictive land use practices are political rather than legal. In Part III,
I present a justification for the Commission's recommendation that the
federal government take a more active role in policing local land use
decisions. Finally, in Part IV, I discuss why I believe the Commission is
correct in assuming that members of Congress would be more willing
than state legislators to restrain the exclusionary practices of suburban
municipalities.
I. NOT IN My BACK YARD
The Advisory Commission on Regulatory Barriers to Affordable
Housing was primarily concerned with housing affordability. For
homeowners, affordability improved during the 1980s, after a previous
decade of increasing real costs. According to the National Association
of Realtors' homeownership affordability index, the median household
in 1990 had ten percent more than the minimum amount needed to
qualify to buy a house valued at the national median. The index value
for 1990 showed that housing was more affordable than it was in 1981
but less affordable than in 1976. The aggregate index value, however,
masked substantial regional differences. The average household in the
West and Northeast had less than ninety percent of the amount neces-
5 See, e.g., John E. Yang, Bush's Modest Domestic Proposals Contrast With Expansive
World Role, Wash. Post, Jan. 30, 1991, at A12 (In his 1991 State of the Union speech,
President Bush extolled virtues of federalism and advocated turning twenty billion dollars in
federal programs "over to the states for them to run free from federal regulations.");
President George Bush, Remarks at the National Governor's Association Meeting
(Washington, D.C., Feb. 3, 1992) ("I want Congress.. to stop showering the states with these
mandates, unfunded mandates.).
[Vol. VIII:703
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sary to purchase a median-priced home. In addition, first time
homebuyers had less than eighty percent of the required funds.6
For renters, affordability problems were more grim. Unlike costs of
homeownership, rents increased in real terms throughout the 1980s,
rising nine percent for the nation as a whole. Again, aggregate statis-
tics mask substantial regional variation; large metropolitan areas on the
east and west coasts had real average rent increases in excess of twenty
percent. The Commission stated that among poor households,
affordability problems were especially severe. In metropolitan areas on
the west coast the proportion of poor households that paid in excess of
thirty-five percent of their income for rent in the late 1980s exceeded
eighty-five percent.7
Secretary Kemp appointed the Advisory Commission on Regulatory
Barriers to Affordable Housing to determine "the degree to which [fed-
eral, state, and local] regulations increase housing costs" and to recom-
mend actions that "should be taken to remove or modify excessive,
duplicative, or unnecessary regulations and requirements."8 Impor-
tantly, the Commission members understood that they were not to rec-
ommend proposals that would increase the amount of money spent by
the federal government on housing assistance.9 Therefore, most of the
Commission's findings and most of its recommendations were limited
to regulation and regulatory relief.' °
6 See Not in My Back Yard, supra note 1, at 1-2.
7 See id. at 1-2 - 1-5. A recent report by Harvard University's Joint Center For Housing
Studies reports that the recession has not reduced rents for poor households, although it has
dampened rent increases at the high end of the market. According to the report, more than
three-quarters of poor, unsubsidized tenants paid more than 50% of their income for housing
in 1990. See Recession Hasn't Helped Low-Income Groups, Report Says, 19 Housing &
Development Rep. 469 (1991). A standard "rule of thumb" maintains that households that
pay more than 30% of their income in rent are burdened by excessive housing costs. See
Michael H. Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing Assistance: The Case of Public
Housing, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 878, 890 n.37 (1990).
8 "This review shall include, but not be limited to: zoning, impact fees, subdivision
ordinances, standards, processing and permitting, rental control, codes and innovation, and
environmental requirements." Not in My Back Yard, supra note I, at C-I.
9 See Gale Cincotta, Viewpoint, Planning, Sept. 1991, at 46 (Commission member states
that the Commission's scope was limited to regulatory barriers.); Anthony Downs, The
Advisory Commission on Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing: Its Behavior and
Accomplishments, 2 Housing Policy Debate 1095 (1991) (Member of Commission states that
"[tihis commission was heavily influenced by the chairman's desire not to make
recommendations that would upset the Bush administration, such as suggesting big increases
in federal spending on housing assistance.").
10 The Commission's failure to recommend additional funding for housing assistance has
been criticized. See Chester Hartman, Comment on Anthony Downs's "The Advisory
Commission on Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing: Its Behavior and
Accomplishments," 2 Housing Policy Debate 1161, 1167 (1991) ("The best form of federal
HeinOnline  -- 8 J.L. & Pol. 705 1991-1992
Journal of Law & Politics
The Commission found a relationship between suburban, central
city, state and federal regulations and increased housing costs. It iden-
tified five types of suburban land use regulations that serve to restrict
the amount of low income housing built in the suburbs: growth con-
trols, zoning, subdivision controls, exactions and excessive permitting
requirements." Some communities enact growth control ordinances
that place a ceiling on the number of building permits that may be
issued annually. In addition, many suburbs seek to limit or eliminate
growth by enacting excessive minimum lot zoning requirements or by
placing large portions of the community's land in agricultural zones.' 2
Municipal zoning ordinances also limit affordable housing by setting
low maximum building heights and densities and by prohibiting multi-
family housing.'" Local requirements for subdividing land came under
especially severe attack by the Commission. According to the report,
some communities "gold-plate" their subdivision ordinances by requir-
ing developers to contribute costly improvements such as wide roads
and expensive schools. Other municipalities require developers to con-
tribute money, sometimes called "exactions," to the community to pay
for infrastructure and off-site improvements, costs that are passed
along to eventual homebuyers. 4 Finally, many municipalities mandate
that developers meet complex standards before obtaining building per-
mits. The cost of complying with these requirements and delays in
obtaining approvals add significantly to the price of suburban
housing.' 5
The Commission speculated about the reasons why suburban munic-
ipalities enact laws that increase the cost of housing. Suburban resi-
dents may fear that an inmigration of lower income households will
aid, of course, would be precisely that which the commission, by consensus, apparently agreed
to reject a priori: more housing subsidies for low-income households.").
I I The Commission's findings and recommendations were not limited to suburban barriers
to affordability: it also cited the federal government, states, and central cities as maintaining
regulations that add to the cost of housing. See Not in My Back Yard, supra note 1, at 3-1 - 4-
12.
12 See id. at 2-2.
13 See id. at 2-5 - 2-8.
14 See id. at 2-8 - 2-12. According to the Commission, exactions, dedications and fees add
up to 30% to the cost of housing in New Jersey. Id. at 2-11. But see Stewart E. Sterk,
Competition Among Municipalities as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions, 45 Vand. L. Rev.
831 (1992) (In certain types of markets the owner of land will bear the cost of exactions rather
than homebuyers.). For an analysis of the legal and economic issues involving land use
exactions, see generally Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions:
Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 473 (1991).
15 See Not in My Back Yard, supra note 1, at 2-12 - 2-14. The Commission cited Orange
County, California as having particularly expensive permitting requirements, the cost of
which adds $20,000 to the price of single-family housing units. Id. at 2-12.
706 [Vol. VIII:703
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reduce their property values. New development may also lead to
despoilation of the environment and deterioration of local public serv-
ices. Increased infrastructure and public service requirements may also
necessitate an increase in taxes. Finally, some suburban residents may
want to preserve the social or ethnic homogeneity of their communities
and to achieve this objective enact laws that exclude lower-income and
minority households.' 6
The states are at the center of the Commission's strategy to reduce
suburban regulatory barriers. For "constitutional and practical rea-
sons,"' 17 the Commission opines, states are in the best position to force
localities to exercise their regulatory powers more responsibly. Local
governments derive their regulatory powers from their states, giving
states the leverage required to accomplish deregulation.'" Since hous-
ing markets are local, the states are in a better position than the federal
government to take into account inter-regional variations; at the same
time states are sufficiently centralized to take into account the extra-
municipal effects of local actions.' 9
The Commission also sees a vital role for the federal government in
"inspiring" state and local governments to reform their regulations.2 °
Not in My Back Yard foresees a dual-pronged federal effort using "car-
rots and sticks." All states and localities receiving federal housing
assistance are currently mandated by law to submit a housing strategy
statement to HUD.2 The Comprehensive Housing Affordability Strat-
egy (CHAS) must include a description of what the community is doing
to remove or ameliorate the negative effects of regulatory barriers. 22 At
present, however, HUD may not disapprove a CHAS or limit housing
assistance on the basis of a state or locality's failure to reduce regula-
tory barriers. 23 The Commission recommends that HUD be given such
power to condition its assistance to state and local governments on
satisfactory barrier removal strategies. 24 A state's failure to undertake
16 See id. at 1-5 - 1-9.
17 Id. at 7-1.
18 See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government Law,
90 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 6-18 (1990) (analysis of the legal relationship between municipalities
and states).
19 See Not in My Back Yard, supra note 1, at 7-2.
20 Id. at 6-1 ("The Federal Government should undertake actions that inspire the States as
well as local governments to reform housing-related regulations.").
21 42 U.S.C.A. § 12705 (West 1991).
22 Id. § 12705(b)(4).
23 Id. § 12705(c)(1)(B).
24 Not in My Back Yard, supra note 1, at 7-1. A somewhat sketchy description of
appropriate state barrier removal strategies is contained in Recommendation 7-1, which
states: "At a minimum, this program should include a comprehensive assessment of State and
1992]
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adequate efforts to remove regulatory barriers would result in loss of its
ability to issue tax-exempt bonds for housing25 and its authority to allo-
cate federal income tax credits to developers of low and moderate
income housing.26  In addition, the Commission recommends that
HUD waive certain federal regulations and provide funds for states to
use in planning and initiating their deregulation efforts.
II. FEDERAL POWER TO REMOVE SUBURBAN REGULATORY BARRIERS
The cornerstone of the Advisory Commission's strategy lies in grant-
ing HUD the ability to condition receipt of certain forms of federal
housing assistance on state efforts to remove regulatory barriers. The
Commission's report did not discuss or propose more direct federal
action to remove barriers by preemption. There is some indication
from the report28 and comments by commissioners2 9 that this failure to
local regulations and administrative procedures, as well as State constitutional authority and
enabling legislation. States should propose a program of State enabling reform and direct
State action, as well as provide for model codes, standards, and technical assistance for local
governments that are responsible for enacting and administering development controls." Id.
at 7-6 - 7-7. More specific recommendations include the preparation of local housing
elements subject to state review and approval, comprehensive planning requirements,
inclusion of housing affordability and opportunity as objectives of state zoning enabling acts,
authority for the state to override local barriers to affordable housing, state-established
housing targets and fair-share standards, time limits on building code and zoning approvals
and permits and the adoption of model subdivision regulations. See id. at 7-7 - 7-11.
25 Federal tax law permits state finance agencies to issue tax exempt bonds to provide
homeowners with below-market interest rate loans. See I.R.C. § 143 (1988). About 1.3
million housing units have been financed with these bonds. See Not In My Back Yard, supra
note 1, at 6-4.
26 Federal tax law permits developers of housing for low and moderate income households
to receive tax credits whose present value is worth between 30 and 70 percent of the value of
their investments. Each state is allocated an annual allotment of tax credits. See I.R.C. § 42.
Over 440,000 units of low income housing have been built using the Low-Income Housing
Tax Credit. See Nick Ravo, Tax-Credit Program on Borrowed Time, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24,
1991, § 10, at 3.
To the extent that state legislatures are either hostile or indifferent to the provision of low
income housing, even if that housing were built in cities, the Commission's proposals could
backfire. State and local inaction could result in the federal government cutting off housing
subsidies to private developers, thereby harming the low and moderate income populations
the Commission is seeking to assist.
27 See Not In My Back Yard, supra note 1, at 6-5.
28 See Not In My Back Yard, supra note 1, at 7-1 ("States are in a unique position, for both
constitutional and practical reasons, to deal with regulatory barriers to affordable housing.").
29 See Downs, supra note 9, at 1122 ("Only state governments have the constitutional
power to regulate [local governments] and to override their local ordinances under defined
circumstances."); Report By the Advisory Commission On Regulatory Barriers to Affordable
Housing: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Policy Research and Insurance and the
Subcomm. on Housing and Community Development of the Comm. on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs, H.R. Rep. No. 57, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1991) [hereinafter Joint Hearing
HeinOnline  -- 8 J.L. & Pol. 708 1991-1992
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recommend more direct federal action may be attributable to a belief
that the federal government does not have the power to regulate local
land use decisions. In this part, I show that Congress has the power to
adopt either an indirect or direct approach to removing regulatory bar-
riers. Under current constitutional doctrine, the choice between condi-
tioning federal housing assistance on deregulation or outright
preemption is one of politics, rather than law.
A. Conditioning Federal Housing Assistance on Deregulation
The constitutionality of the Commission's recommendation that the
federal government condition various forms of housing assistance on
the adoption by states and localities of barrier removal strategies is
clear. A recent Supreme Court decision supports the argument that
even if Congress did not have the pbwer to eliminate restrictive land
use practices itself,"0 it could still encourage states to do so by adopting
a strategy of conditional grants.
In South Dakota v. Dole,"' South Dakota challenged a federal statute
that required the Secretary of Transportation to withhold a portion of a
state's allotment of highway funds if persons under the age of twenty-
one were permitted to purchase or possess alcoholic beverages.
Because of the Twenty-first Amendment, 2 it is questionable that the
federal government had the power to set a minimum national drinking
age directly.33 Nevertheless, the Court held that Congress was not
barred from achieving indirectly through the spending power 4 what it
was unable to do directly. However, the Court in Dole did place some
limitations on Congress's power: The exercise of the spending power
must be in pursuit of the general welfare, the condition must be unam-
biguous and related to the federal interest in particular national
projects or programs, and no independent constitutional bar to the
Report] (Statement by Commission Vice Chairman that "there is not a great deal of clout that
the Federal Government has [in eliminating regulatory barriers] ....").
30 Congress does, in fact, possess the authority to remove restrictive land use barriers
directly under its power to regulate commerce. See infra text accompanying notes 38-75.
31 483 U.S. 203 (1987). See also New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2427 (1992)
(Congress may make grants to states on the condition that they attain a series of regulatory
milestones.).
32 U.S. Const. amend. XXI (repealing the prohibition of intoxicating liquors).
33 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 218 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[T]he regulation of the age of the
purchasers of liquor, just as the regulation of the prices at which liquor may be sold, falls
squarely within the scope of those powers reserved to the States by the Twenty-First
Amendment.")
34 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
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conditional grant can exist."s In its analysis, the Court also indicated
that a condition might be invalid if it were "so coercive as to pass the
point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion'." 6 The Court held
that each of these requirements was met by the conditional highway
grants, including the one providing that no independent constitutional
bar to the condition exist. According to the Court, the "independent
constitutional bar" limitation did not forbid the indirect achievement
by Congress of objectives that it was not empowered to achieve
directly, but instead prohibited Congress from using the spending
power to induce states to engage in activities that would, themselves, be
unconstitutional.37 Finally, the Court observed that the condition at
issue was not coercive since a state failing to adopt a minimum drinking
age statute would lose only five percent of its highway subsidies.
If Congress chose to adopt the recommendations of the Advisory
Commission on Regulatory Barriers to Housing and condition housing
subsidies on state regulatory barrier removal, such a statute would eas-
ily meet the requirements set forth in South Dakota v. Dole. The Court
would almost certainly accept Congress's probable justification that
land use restrictions increase the cost of housing and harm low and
moderate income households.3 " The conditioning of subsidies, and the
resultant lower housing prices would be closely tied to the federal
interest in operating its low income housing programs. Furthermore,
state removal of regulatory barriers would violate no independent con-
stitutional protections. Finally, it is unlikely that the threat of a loss of
relatively modest amounts of housing subsidies would be deemed
coercive.3 9
35 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-09.
36 Id. at 211 (quoting from Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
37 Id. at 210.
38 See id. at 207 (Courts should defer to the judgment of Congress with respect to its view
of the general welfare.).
39 Congress has already influenced states and localities to adopt land use policies through
its use of the spending power. For example, under the National Flood Insurance Program,
Congress required all participating communities to adopt local flood plain management
measures to reduce or avoid flood damage. In response to low rates of participation,
Congress mandated that certain forms of federal housing assistance be denied to communities
that chose not to participate in the program. In addition, property owners in participating
communities were required to purchase flood insurance or become ineligible to receive direct
federal housing assistance or mortgage loans from federally supervised financial institutions.
See 42 U.S.C. § 4106 (1988). In 1978, a federal court rejected a lawsuit challenging the flood
insurance program under the Tenth Amendment, the Takings Clause and the Due Process
Clause. See Texas Landowners Rights Assoc. v. Harris, 453 F. Supp. 1025 (D.D.C. 1978),
aff'd, 598 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927 (1979).
[Vol. VIII:703
HeinOnline  -- 8 J.L. & Pol. 710 1991-1992
Reducing Suburban Barriers to Affordable Housing
B. Direct Preemption
Rather than relying on the states to act in response to conditional
grants, Congress could act directly to eliminate restrictive suburban
land use practices by exercising its own constitutional power to regu-
late commerce. 40 States and localities might challenge federal legisla-
tion preempting restrictive zoning ordinances on the grounds that (1)
land use regulation does not fall within Congress's power to regulate
interstate commerce and (2) the states' powers to regulate land use are
protected from federal interference by the Tenth Amendment. Neither
of these challenges, however, would be likely to succeed.
The Supreme Court has, since the early days of the republic, repeat-
edly stated that Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce is
extremely broad.4' Nevertheless, prior to the late 1930s, the Court
repeatedly struck down federal laws on the ground that they were
directed to intrastate rather than interstate concerns. 42 According to
the Court, the commerce power was limited to activities that directly
affected interstate commerce.43
Beginning in the late 1930s, the Court substantially relaxed its stan-
dards for determining the reach of the federal commerce power. 44 For
example, in Wickard v. Fillburn,45 a farmer challenged the power of the
federal government to set quotas on the amount of wheat he could har-
vest. The quotas included wheat that he planned to consume rather
than sell. In response to Fillburn's argument that these harvest limita-
tions regulated activities that were local in nature, the Court stated that
even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be
regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be
reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce, and this irrespective of whether such effect
is what might at some earlier time have been defined as "direct"
or "indirect.",46
40 The Commerce Clause empowers Congress "to regulate Commerce ... among the
several States." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
41 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824).
42 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating the Bituminous
Coal Conservation Act of 1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935) (invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933); Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251 (1918) (invalidating act that prohibited interstate transportation of goods
manufactured using child labor).
43 See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 544 (1935) (invalidating the
application of minimum wage and maximum hour laws to a poultry farmer on the ground that
the farmer's activities did not "directly 'affect' interstate commerce."). (emphasis in original)
44 See Nat'l. Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)
(upholding the National Labor Relations Act of 1935).
45 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
46 Id. at 125.
1992]
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Even though Fillburn's consumption of wheat might be a "trivial" com-
ponent of aggregate demand, the Court ruled that when taken together
with other similarly-situated farmers the effect would be significant.4 7
Since its 1941 decision in United States v. Darby48 upholding the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, 49 the Supreme Court has not invalidated
any federal legislation on the ground that the subject matter was
outside the scope of commerce susceptible to federal regulation. Fed-
eral regulation of seemingly local activities ranging from the exclusion
of blacks from restaurants 50 to "loan sharking"'" has been upheld.
In determining whether a law enacted pursuant to the Commerce
Clause is constitutional, the Court has adopted a two-pronged test. It
will defer to a Congressional finding that a regulated activity affects
interstate commerce " 'if there is any rational basis for such a find-
ing.'"52 In addition, the Court will only require that the means
selected by Congress be " 'reasonably adapted to the end permitted by
the Constitution.' -53 Under such a rational basis test, a Congressional
preemption of local land use ordinances would be deemed well within
the power to regulate interstate commerce. Restrictive suburban zon-
ing ordinances may affect interstate commerce in a number of ways,
including reducing the demand for building materials, inhibiting the
migration of people to particular locales, and increasing the wages sub-
urban employers must pay to attract a workforce.5 4 Preemption of
these land use practices would be directly related to alleviating their
negative effects.
Opponents of federal preemption of local land use practices might
also challenge deregulation on the ground that it interferes with inte-
gral state and local governmental functions. Courts and commentators
have repeatedly noted that land use regulation is a governmental activ-
47 Id. at 127-28.
48 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
49 The provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act challenged in Darby were those that
prohibited the interstate shipment of goods produced by employees whose wages were below
a prescribed minimum or whose hours were greater than a prescribed maximum. Id. at 110-
11. The decision overturned Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). See supra note 42.
50 See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding application of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to a restaurant located over one mile from interstate highway).
51 See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding application of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act to "loan-sharking" activities that took place entirely within New York
State).
52 Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990) (quoting from
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association, 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981)).
53 Id.
54 Suburban land use practices also contribute to the problem of concentrated poverty in
central cities, necessitating increased federal expenditures for social welfare programs. See
infra text accompanying notes 94-110.
[Vol. VIII:703712
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ity particularly important to states and localities.55 Nevertheless, with
only a couple of notable exceptions, the Supreme Court since Darby has
refused to invalidate federal exercises of the commerce power on the
ground that the legislation interferes with the activities of states and
localities. In 1976, the Court, in National League of Cities v. Usery,5 6 inval-
idated a federal statute that prescribed labor standards for municipal
employees. Based in part on principles derived from the Tenth
Amendment,57 the Court drew a distinction between regulating private
citizens and the "States as States."'58 According to the Court, there are
"attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government which
may not be impaired by Congress ... because the Constitution prohib-
its it from exercising the authority in that manner."'5 9 Until National
League of Cities was overruled in 1985, the Court applied a three-
pronged test to determine whether a regulation enacted pursuant to
the Commerce Clause was impermissible. To be invalidated, the stat-
ute must (1) have regulated the "States as States," (2) have addressed
matters that were indisputably "attribute[s] of state sovereignty," and
(3) have made apparent that compliance by the states would directly
impair their ability to "structure integral operations in areas of tradi-
tional governmental functions. '
In 1985, a closely-divided Supreme Court overturned National League
of Cities and held that federally-prescribed labor standards could be
applied to employees of a public transit authority, despite the transit
authority's legal status as a local public body. In Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority6 the Court observed that the "principal
means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the
55 See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (discussing importance of
zoning to local communities); Izzo v. Borough of River Edge, 843 F.2d 765, 769 (3d Cir.
1988) ("Land use policy customarily has been considered a feature of local government and
an area in which the tenets of federalism are particularly strong."); Kent Island Joint Venture
v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455, 462 (D. Md. 1978) ("Land use regulation by zoning is 'distinctly a
feature of local government' which is 'outside the general supervisory power of federal
courts'.") (quoting from Hill v. City of El Paso, 437 F.2d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 1971)); cf. Note,
Land Use Regulation, the Federal Courts, and the Abstention Doctrine, 89 Yale L.J. 1134,
1142 (1980) ("[A]bstention in land use cases may in fact have become the rule.").
56 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985); New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (discussed infra note 69.).
57 U.S. Const. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.").
58 Vational League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845.
59 Id.
60 See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981)
(quoting from National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854, 845, 852).
61 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
19921 713
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federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself."6 2
After establishing that the Constitution builds protections for states
into the federal system, the Court concluded that "the fundamental
limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce
Clause to protect the 'States as States' is one of process rather than one
of result."-63 In effect, the Court in Garcia held that the states may not
look to the judicial branch to protect their constitutional status, but
must instead rely upon the structure of the federal system. The Court,
however, left open two possible avenues for challenging federal regula-
tions on the ground that they interfere with state functions. First, the
Court stated that it might step in to protect the states if it found some
failure of the political process.' Second, the Court implied that some
affirmative limits on federal action affecting states under the Commerce
Clause might exist, but explicitly refrained from identifying those
limits .65
The Supreme Court's decision in Garcia elicited sharp criticism from
numerous quarters6 6 as well as a prediction by now-ChiefJustice Rehn-
quist that it would soon be overturned.6 7 Even though two recent
Supreme Court decisions6" may signal an increased receptivity on the
part of the justices to federalism-based challenges to federal regula-
tion," it is highly unlikely that federal preemption of restrictive zoning
62 Id. at 550. Among the structural protections against federal government overreaching
mentioned by the Court are the states' control over electoral qualifications, their role in the
Electoral College, and their equal representation in the United States Senate. Id. at 551. See
also Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process 176-80 (1980);
Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954).
63 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554.
64 "Any substantive restraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers must find its
justification in the procedural nature of this basic limitation, and must be tailored to
compensate for possible failings in the national political process .. " Id. at 554 (citation
omitted). See also South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512 (1988) ("[S]ome extraordinary
defects in the national political process might render regulation of state activities invalid
under the Tenth Amendment.").
65 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556.
66 For a summary of the dissents in Garcia and scholarly commentary, see Michael H. Schill,
Intergovernmental Takings and Just Compensation: A Question of Federalism, 137 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 829, 879 n.196 (1989).
67 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting) ("a principle [that Congress may not
act to infringe on certain fundamental aspects of state sovereignty] ... will, I am confident, in
time again command the support of a majority of this Court.").
68 See New York v. United, 112 S. Ct. 2408; Gregory v. Ashcroft, 1 I S. Ct. 2395 (1991).
69 In Ashcroft, the Court held that state court judges were not protected by the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967. After noting that the authority of state
residents to determine the qualifications of their important government officials "lies at 'the
heart of representative government,' " the majority adopted a "plain statement rule" to
"avoid a potential constitutional problem." Ill S. Ct. at 2402-2403 (quoting Bernal v.
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ordinances would be deemed to violate the Constitution. Even during
the period in which National League of Cities was good law, the Court
would have found such regulation unobjectionable, as is made appar-
ent by Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass 'n,70 decided in
1981. In Hodel, the State of Virginia and Virginia mining interests chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the Surface Mining Control and Recla-
mation Act of 1977 7 on the ground that the statute violated the Tenth
Amendment. 72 Under the Act, the federal government developed stan-
dards and requirements for strip mining, including the restoration of
land and preservation of topsoil, which were to be enforced by states
with satisfactory regulatory programs or by the federal government
itself.73 The district court had invalidated the Act on the ground that it
interfered with the states' traditional governmental function of regulat-
ing land use.74 The Supreme Court in reversing the district court's
decision did not challenge the court's characterization of land use plan-
ning as an "integral governmental function." Nevertheless, the Court
stated that the National League of Cities test required that the challenged
regulation be addressed to the state itself and not merely be a regula-
tion of private parties. 75 Under the same analysis, federal preemption
Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 221 (1984)). The Court decided that Congress had not made clear that
state judges were included in the coverage of the ADEA. A separate opinion by Justices White
and Stevens stated that the majority's plain statement requirement "is not only
unprecedented, it directly contravenes our decisions in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority and South Carolina v. Baker." Id. at 2410 (White, J. and Stevens, J., concurring
and dissenting) (citations omitted). In New York v. United States, the petitioner challenged
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act. The Act provided that if states failed to make
arrangements for the disposal of low-level radioactive wastes by January 1, 1996, they would
be required, upon the request a generator or owner of waste, to take title to and possession of
the waste. The Court observed that the Constitution forbade Congress from compelling
states to enact and enforce federal regulations. See 112 S. Ct. at 2420. The Court also stated
that Congress could not transfer the waste from the generators to state governments. See id.
at 2428. Therefore, the Court held that the "take title" provisions of the Act were
unconstitutional since Congress lacked the power to offer the states a choice between two
"unconstitutionally coercive" alternatives. See id.
70 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
71 30 U.S.C §§ 1201-1328 (1988).
72 The state and surface miners also challenged the Act on the ground that it violated the
Commerce Clause by regulating intrastate activities and that it violated the Equal Protection,
Due Process, and Takings Clauses of the Constitution. 452 U.S. at 273. The Court found that
Congress had a rational basis for believing that surface coal mining had a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. Id. at 280.
73 30 U.S.C. §§ 1253-54, 1265(b) (1988).
74 Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425, 435 (W.D.
Va.), prob. juris. noted, 449 U.S. 817 (1980), modified, 452 U.S. 264, and vacated, 453 U.S.
901 (1981).
75 "[N]othing in National League of Cities suggests that the Tenth Amendment shields the
States from pre-emptive federal regulation of private activities affecting commerce." Hodel, 452
U.S. at 290-91 (emphasis in original). See also New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. at 2430
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of restrictive suburban land use regulations would also present no con-
stitutional problem since the federal government would merely dis-
place local regulation of private individuals with federal oversight.
III. A JUSTIFICATION FOR INCREASED FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF
SUBURBAN REGULATORY BARRIERS
My conclusion in Part II that Congress has the power to force states
and localities to relax restrictive land use regulations does not, of
course, necessarily lead to the conclusion that Congress should exer-
cise that power. Even if Congress were to adopt the moderate recom-
mendations of the Advisory Commission on Regulatory Barriers to
Affordable Housing, it would mark a sharp break with the "hands off"
approach usually adopted by the federal government with respect to
matters of local land use regulation. There are many reasons why the
federal government should be reluctant to involve itself in regulating
land use.76 Regulating the use of land pursuant to the police power is
traditionally one of the most important functions of state and local gov-
ernments. 7 The Framers of the Constitution envisioned that state gov-
ernments would provide a check against the power of the national
government.78 Interfering with or diluting the authority of states and
localities to carry out their most basic functions may undermine their
central role in our federal system, leaving them hollow shells rather
than vibrant forums for local political participation and legislative
activity.
79
(distinguishing permissible regulation of individuals from impermissible requirements that
states adopt federal regulations.).
76 Cf. Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: Residential Real Estate Finance Law In
the 1990s and the Implications of Changing Financial Markets, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1261, 1287
(1991) ("[P]roponents of preempting state real estate finance law bear the burden of
persuasion.").
77 See supra note 55. Municipalities have no inherent power to regulate land use. Local
governments are created by the states and empowered to regulate the use of land either by a
general delegation from the state of the police power, a state zoning enabling act, or a home
rule charter. See Briffault, supra note 18, at 6-18 (analysis of the legal relationship between
municipalities and states).
78 According to Hamilton:
Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government will at all
times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, and these
will have the same disposition towards the general government. The people by
throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If
their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the other as the
instrument of redress.
The Federalist No. 28, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
79 The exercise of substantive power by state and local officials gives them the opportunity
to develop competence, demonstrate their abilities at governance, and earn the support of
716
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In addition to protecting individual liberty, exercise of independent
governmental authority at state and local levels in many instances pro-
motes economic efficiency. To be efficient, government must act in
ways that correspond to the desires of its constituents. As long as tastes
for government intervention can be expected to vary across states and
localities, and government actions do not generate significant spillover
effects, decentralized lawmaking will maximize utility.80 In particular, if
the responsibility for policy generation and legal rulemaking is situated
at the local level, citizens who constitute a majority at the local level but
are in the minority at the national level will be able to satisfy their pref-
erences at no cost to the rest of the nation.8 Furthermore, the exist-
ence of governmental authority in states and localities enables these
jurisdictions to try innovative systems of regulation which if successful
can be emulated by other communities and which if unsuccessful will
not harm the entire nation.82
The demand for land use regulation is likely to vary across regions
and localities. In part, this is attributable to the existence of regionally
differentiated political cultures: People in some parts of the nation sup-
port an activist role for the public sector in regulating property,
whereas those in other regions support a limited government role and
the preservation of property rights.83 In addition, preferences for dif-
ferent patterns of residential settlement differ greatly both within states
and among regions. Some households prefer living in rural communi-
ties with an abundance of open space whereas others prefer the higher
densities of metropolitan areas.
Local control over land use regulation in general, and exclusionary
zoning in particular, plays a special role in the achievement of eco-
nomic efficiency. A fundamental theorum of urban economics, the Tie-
their constituents. See George C.S. Benson, Values of Decentralized Government-1961, in
Institute For Studies in Federalism, Essays in Federalism 1, 10 (1961); Arthur W. Macmahon,
The Problems of Federalism: A Survey, in Federalism: Mature and Emergent 3, 11 (A.
Macmahon ed. 1955); Schill, supra note 66, at 866-68.
80 This point is explained in greater detail in Schill, supra note 76, at 1288-1304.
81 Cf. Gordon Tullock, Federalism: Problems of Scale, 6 Pub. Choice 19, 22 (1969) ("[Tlhe
individual will suffer less cost from governmental activities of which he disapproves the
smaller the government.").
82 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("[A] single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
83 Cf. DanielJ. Elazar, American Federalism: A View From the States 114-22 (3d ed. 1984)
(discussing how political cultures and attitudes toward government regulation vary across
regions and states in the United States). For a summary of the empirical literature testing
Elazar's observation see Schill, supra note 76, at 1301-03.
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bout Model, 4 posits that competition among municipalities is likely to
promote economic efficiency. Based upon a set of "heroic" assump-
tions" including perfect information, costless mobility, and the
absence of external effects, Tiebout maintains that citizens are consum-
ers who choose to reside in communities that offer their desired mix of
public goods.8 6 The existence of decentralized local governments with
the power to regulate and provide public services permits individuals to
"vote with their feet," selecting a package of taxes and services that is
more likely to reflect their preferences than any probable combination
offered by a higher level of government.8 7
A stable Tiebout equilibrium requires that all residents of a jurisdic-
tion pay the same amount of taxes (head taxes) for public goods.
Otherwise, a deadweight loss would occur as some individuals pay
more for public goods than the benefits they receive, and others have
their consumption of services subsidized. This subsidization of public
goods would encourage households to migrate into the community to
take advantage of the subsidy and lead households who received less
value from services than they paid in taxes to migrate elsewhere.
Exclusionary zoning can cause property taxation, the main form of
locally-derived revenue in most municipalities, to approximate a head
tax.88 Zoning regulations such as minimum lot and floor area require-
ments can establish a minimum value for homes in a community and
thus ensure that no household pays less in taxes than its pro rata share
of the cost of goods and services provided by the municipality.89
The Advisory Commission on Regulatory Barriers to Affordable
Housing charges that restrictive zoning regulations increase the cost of
housing and are therefore undesirable. It does not fully explain, how-
ever, why higher housing prices are undesirable, and more importantly,
why the federal government should step in to remedy the problem. 90
At least in terms of economic efficiency, increased housing costs are not
necessarily undesirable if the households who pay for the housing bear
84 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416, 418,
422 (1956).
85 See Wallace E. Oates, An Economist's Perspective on Fiscal Federalism, in The Political
Economy of Fiscal Federalism 3, 7 (Wallace E. Oates ed., 1977).
86 See Tiebout, supra note 84, at 418-19.
87 See id. at 418, 420, 422.
88 See Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local
Governments, 12 Urb. Studies 205, 206-07 (1975).
89 Id.
90 The report conclusorily states that "[i]t is inequitable and a waste of taxpayers' money to
continue to provide housing assistance to governments that maintain policies limiting housing
affordability." Not in My Back Yard, supra note 1, at 11-2.
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the full cost of the regulations and receive benefits in excess of the
increased expense. However, if higher housing values are caused not
by increased community desirability, but by artificial supply restraints,
then the allocation of resources will be less than optimal.9 Empirical
studies demonstrate that existing homeowners do use restrictive land
use regulations as a means of obtaining monopoly profits.92
In addition to the inefficiencies generated by artificial supply
restraints, restrictive land use regulations may waste resources because
of the alternative locations chosen or forced upon firms and house-
holds. Suburban employees who cannot afford housing in close prox-
imity to theirjobs must devote more time to commuting. Increased use
of cars leads to more rapid automobile depreciation, greater highway
congestion, and air pollution.9"
Restrictive suburban land use practices also have enormously nega-
tive effects on low income households in central cities that result in
both adverse efficiency and distributive consequences for the nation.94
In recent years, the extent of concentrated ghetto poverty in large cities
of the Northeast and Midwest has increased dramatically.95 One study
indicates that from 1970 to 1980, the number of people with incomes
below the poverty level living in census tracts where over 40% of the
91 See Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis,
86 Yale L.J. 385, 404, 430-31 (1977) (Existing homeowners can use zoning to obtain
monopoly profits in suburbs with unique geographic or cultural features.).
92 See, e.g., Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and the Exercise of Monopoly Power, 5 J. Urb.
Econ. 116, 125-28 (1978) (Study of metropolitan areas suggests that house price variations
between communities of as much as 50% may be attributable to monopoly zoning.); Louis A.
Rose, Urban Land Supply: Natural and Contrived Restrictions, 25 J. Urb. Econ. 325, 344
(1989) (Forty percent of the interurban house price variation in 45 urban areas may be
explained by monopoly zoning.). See also William A. Fischel, Do Growth Controls Matter? A
Review of Empirical Evidence on the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Local Government Land
Use Regulation 36 (1990) (Study by Pollakowski and Wachter showing spillover effects of land
use controls supports theory of monopoly zoning.).
93 See Not in My Back Yard, supra note 1, at 2-3. Suburbs that zone out commercial and
manufacturing land uses may exacerbate the problem by forcing firms to locate further away
from areas of population concentration. An additional inefficiency of dispersed employment
locations would be the possible loss of agglomeration economies. See William A. Fischel,
The Economics of Zoning Laws: A Property Rights Approach to American Land Use Controls
261-69 (1985); David F. Bradford and Wallace E. Oates, Suburban Exploitation of Central
Cities and Governmental Structure, in Redistribution through Public Choice 43, 54, 65-67, 84
(Harold M. Hochman & George E. Peterson eds., 1974).
94 For purposes of this article, a government action that generates an adverse distributional
effect is one that redistributes wealth from people with lower income to those of higher
income. For a more detailed analysis of the effects of exclusionary zoning on poor central city
residents see Michael H. Schill, Deconcentrating the Inner City Poor, 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
(forthcoming 1992).
95 Paul A. Jargowsky & MaryJ. Bane, Ghetto Poverty in the United States, 1970-1980, in
The Urban Underclass 235, 252-54 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991).
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population were poor increased 29.5% from 1.9 million to 2.4 mil-
lion.96 Additional research shows that the concentration of the urban
poor accelerated in the 1980s. 97 Concentrated ghetto poverty affects
black households with much greater frequency than white
households .98
Restrictive suburban land use practices have contributed to the exist-
ence of concentrated inner city poverty and, at present, impede efforts
to alleviate its effects. Over the past three decades, central cities have
lost a tremendous number of their low-skilled jobs to the suburbs,
other regions of the United States, and foreign nations.99 Many of
these jobs are inaccessible to the inner-city poor because they are
unable to move to locations nearby due to the absence of affordable
housing.'00 Public transportation is insufficient to enable potential
employees living in central cities to reach many suburban locations. In
addition, households living at great distances from centers of job crea-
tion are less likely to learn about the existence of employment opportu-
96 Id. at 253. See also Mark A. Hughes, Misspeaking Truth to Power: A Geographical
Perspective on the "Underclass" Fallacy, 65 Econ. Geography 187, 194 (1989) (Census tracts
with concentrations of poor households increased from 1970 to 1980.); John C. Weicher,
How Poverty Neighborhoods Are Changing, in Inner-City Poverty in the United States 68, 70
(Lawrence E. Lynn & Michael G. H. McGeary eds., 1990).
97 See Richard P. Nathan & Charles F. Adams, Four Perspectives on Urban Hardship, 104
Pol. Sci. Q. 483, 501 (1989).
98 See Jargowsky & Bane, supra note 95, at 252 (In 1980, 65% of the ghetto poor were
black, 22% Hispanic and 13% non-Hispanic white and other races.); Nathan & Adams, supra
note 97, at 504 (Over three-quarters of all poor urban black households lived in concentrated
poverty tracts in 1986 as compared to 43% of poor urban white households.).
99 See John D. Kasarda, Urban Industrial Transition and the Underclass, 501 Annals of the
Amer. Academy of Political and Social Science 26, 29-30 (1989) (In the 1970s, large northern
central cities lost large numbers of jobs in the occupational categories of clerical, sales and
blue-collar employment whereas their suburbs gained jobs in all occupational categories.).
100 The first proponent of the spatial mismatch hypothesis was John F. Kain, Housing
Segregation, Negro Employment and Metropolitan Decentralization, 82 QJ. Econ. 175
(1968). The bulk of empirical evidence supports the proposition that the residential locations
of the inner city poor place them at a disadvantage in obtaining employment and higher
salaries. See Harry J. Holzer, The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis: What Has the Evidence
Shown?, 28 Urb. Stud. 105, 118 (1991) ("It seems fair to say, therefore, that the
preponderance of evidence from data of the last decade shows that spatial mismatch has a
significant effect on black employment."). See also Schill, supra note 94, at - ("Although the
results of these tests are not all consistent, the weight of the evidence supports the argument
that the location of inner city poor households, especially black households living in the older
cities of the North and Midwest, creates a disadvantage for them in escaping poverty."). But
see Christopher Jencks and Susan E. Mayer, Residential Segregation, Job Proximity, and
BlackJob Opportunities, in Inner-City Poverty in the United States, supra note 96, at 187, 218
(The findings of empirical studies on the spatial mismatch hypothesis "tell a very mixed
story.").
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nities. " Suburban zoning practices contribute to this spatial mismatch
of jobs and residences by prohibiting multifamily housing and inflating
the cost of existing and newly-constructed single family homes.
In addition to harming their prospects of finding employment, the
absence of affordable housing in the suburbs has contributed to an
array of problems confronting poor households in the inner city. As
middle and working class households leave the ghetto, the poor, who
are unable to move, have grown increasingly socially isolated. In his
book, The Truly Disadvantaged,'°2 and in several recent articles,'0 3 Wil-
liam Julius Wilson argues that concentrated ghetto poverty generates a
wide array of social problems that are both different in magnitude and
kind from the problems poor people face in less concentrated sur-
roundings. Children growing up in inner-city communities frequently
develop weak attachments to the labor force as a result of an absence of
both employed role-models and reasonable prospects of obtaining a
job.' °4 They often turn to deviant or illegal activities to earn income,
thereby further distancing themselves from middle class norms. 0 5
Other people in the community who share similar views reinforce these
attitudes and behaviors. The "concentration effects"'0 6 generated by
living in ghetto poverty may intensify as communities become increas-
ingly populated by unskilled residents who engage in deviant or illegal
behaviors, and as employers relocate elsewhere to gain access to a
more highly trained workforce and escape negative externalities.
Recent empirical studies support Wilson's hypothesis that living in a
poor inner-city community has an effect on residents that is independ-
ent from the effect of earning a low income. 10 7
101 Katherine M. O'Regan & John M. Quigley, Labor Market Access and Labor Market
Outcomes For Urban Youth, 21 Reg. Sci. & Urb. Econ. 277, 290 (1991).
102 William J. Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and
Public Policy (1987).
103 E.g., WilliamJ. Wilson, Public Policy Research and "The Truly Disadvantaged," in The
Urban Underclass, supra note 95, at 460 [hereinafter Public Policy Research]; William J.
Wilson, Studying Inner-City Social Dislocations: The Challenge of Public Agenda Research,
56 Am. Soc. Rev. 1, 9-10 (1991) [hereinafter Inner-City Social Dislocations].
104 Inner-City Social Dislocations, supra note 103, at 10.
105 See Public Policy Research, supra note 103, at 472.
106 Inner-City Social Dislocations, supra note 103, at 11. "The issue is not simply that the
underclass or ghetto poor have a marginal position in the labor market similar to that of other
disadvantaged groups, it is also that their economic position is uniquely reinforced by their
social milieu." Id. at 12.
107 See Elijah Anderson, Neighborhood Effects on Teenage Pregnancy, in The Urban
Underclass, supra note 95, at 375 (The street culture of ghettos supports early sexual activity,
drug use and other forms of delinquency.); Jonathan Crane, The Epidemic Theory of Ghettos
and Neighborhood Effects on Dropping Out and Teenage Childbearing, 96 Am.J. Soc. 1226,
1236, 1240 (1991) (Data show that as the proportion of high status jobs in a community
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The harmful external effects that suburban exclusionary land use
practices have on the residents of central cities thus emerge as strong
justifications for the Commission's recommendation that the federal
government step in to fight restrictive land use regulations. Neither
suburbs nor the states in which they are located bear the full costs of
restrictive land use practices. In many metropolitan areas such as New
York City, Philadelphia and Washington, D.C., restrictive land use
practices in the suburbs of one state have the effect of reducing the
mobility of people who live in cities outside that state."0 The federal
government is the only existing governmental entity with the authority
to internalize this externality. Even in those instances where cities and
suburbs are all within the same state, a substantial portion of the costs
of exclusionary zoning is not borne by residents of that state because of
the central role played by the federal government in redistributing
income. 0 9 Restrictive suburban zoning contributes to concentrated
inner-city poverty which, in turn, contributes to the vicious cycle of
inter-generational poverty in central cities. Since the federal govern-
ment shoulders a major share of the financial responsibility for social
welfare programs for these people, it also has a vital interest in elimi-
nating impediments to their social and economic mobility, including
suburban barriers to affordable housing.10
IV. THE POLITICS OF SUBURBAN LAND USE REGULATORY REFORM
Underlying the Commission's recommendation that the federal gov-
ernment "inspire" the states to reform local regulatory practices by
threatening to cut off certain housing subsidies must be the assumption
that the federal government is more likely to "crack down" on restric-
decreases, the proportion of teenage women who become pregnant and the proportion of
teenage men and women who drop out of school increases in a non-linear fashion.).
108 For example, residents of New York City may not be able to find affordable housing in
the city's suburbs located in northern New Jersey and southern Connecticut because of
restrictive land use practices.
109 The federal government bears the major share of funding responsibility for many
redistributive programs including direct transfer programs such as Aid to Families With
Dependent Children and Supplemental Security Income as well as in-kind transfer programs
such as Medicaid and Food Stamps. The federal government pays for three-quarters of the
nation's public assistance programs. SeeJoseph E. Stiglitz, Economics of the Public Sector 39
(2d ed. 1988). The central role of the federal government in redistribution is supported by
economic theory. See Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Federalism 6-8 (1972) (Redistribution at the
local or state level will cause an influx of low income households and an exodus of high
income residents.).
I10 The Advisory Commission seems to recognize the logic of this analysis, at least with
respect to the effect suburban land use practices have on the cost of federal housing
assistance. See supra note 90.
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tive land use regulations than the states. Yet, nowhere in the report or
in articles or statements by the commissioners is this assumption justi-
fied. In this part, I suggest that the Commission's assumption is cor-
rect: Although enormous obstacles exist to Congress taking effective
action to eliminate restrictive suburban land use practices, members of
Congress are nevertheless more likely to act than state legislators.
Members of Congress who represent states where restrictive suburban
land use practices are utilized are more likely than state legislators to
represent constituents who live in both cities and suburbs and, on aver-
age, are likely to be more sympathetic to the needs of low income
citydwellers. More importantly, interest groups that oppose exclusion-
ary zoning practices are more likely to be influential in Washington
than in state capitals.
A. The Limited Success of State and Federal Legislative Efforts to Remove
Suburban Land Use Barriers to Affordable Housing
With only a few exceptions, state legislatures have failed to take
action against exclusionary land use practices despite the repeated urg-
ings of federal commissions, the housing construction industry, low
income housing advocates, and in some cases, their own courts. The
reticence of states to act on their own is ironically underscored by the
two examples of state legislation the Commission characterized as
"extraordinary State actions intended to produce significant change at
the local level ... ."' The first, Massachusetts's so-called "anti-snob"
zoning law, empowers a state agency to override local land use deci-
sions that impede low income housing construction where the decisions
are not "reasonable in view of the regional need for low and moderate
income housing .. 1. '2 This law is quite modest; it authorizes zoning
overrides only if the developer of the proposed housing is a non-profit
sponsor or a state agency."' In addition, if ten percent of the housing
in a locality is already affordable to low and moderate income house-
holds, the state may not override local land use regulations, regardless
of the magnitude of the regional need." 4
I I I Not In My Back Yard, supra note I, at 7-3. More ambitious initiatives such as the New
York Urban Development Corporation's efforts to override suburban zoning ordinances and
build low income housing in the suburbs have failed in the face of vehement suburban
opposition. See Michael N. Danielson, The Politics of Exclusion 320-21 (1976).
112 Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 40B §§ 20, 23 (Law. Co-op 1983 & Supp. 1991).
113 Id. § 21.
114 Id. § 20.
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New Jersey's Fair Housing Act,115 also cited by the Commission as an
innovative state legislative effort to override restrictive local zoning
ordinances, 116 would more accurately be described as a legislative
retreat from the objective of removing suburban barriers to affordable
housing. The New Jersey legislature acted not out of a desire to "open
up the suburbs," but rather in response to enormous pressure by sub-
urban communities to protect them from the rulings of the New Jersey
Supreme Court in the Mount Laurel"H7 litigation. In 1975, the court
found that the land use practices of New Jersey communities violated
the state constitution and ordered localities to take affirmative action to
amend their zoning ordinances so as to permit housing affordable by
low and moderate income households "at least to the extent of the
municipality's fair share of the present and prospective regional need
therefor."' "
8
After several years of state and local legislative inaction, the court in
1983 instructed lower courts to award plaintiffs what became known as
the "builder's remedy." If a developer proposed to build housing that
included a substantial number of units affordable to lower income
households and could show that the municipality had not met its fair
share obligation, lower courts were instructed to order the municipality
to permit construction of both market- and below-market-rate
housing.
119
In response to the uproar generated by the Mount Laurel litigation
and the fear of suburban municipalities that they would lose control of
their growth, the New Jersey legislature enacted the Fair Housing Act
of 1985.120 The Act established a moratorium on the ability of courts to
order builder's remedies and set up a state agency, the Council on
Affordable Housing (COAH), to determine fair share requirements for
individual towns and to certify whether plans submitted by the munici-
115 N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 52:27D-301 et. seq. (West 1986 & Supp. 1991).
116 The legislation was strongly supported by then-Governor Thomas Kean. See Harold A.
MacDougall, Regional Contribution Agreements: Compensation For Exclusionary Zoning, 60
Temple L. Q. 665, 679-80, n.1 11 (1987) (Fair Housing Act contained virtually all of Governor
Kean's proposed revisions; Robert Hanley, Open Housing is Mired in Lawsuits Again, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 2, 1990, at B-I (Governor Kean considers regional contribution agreements to be
"ideal.") Kean later served as the Chairman of the Advisory Commission on Regulatory
Barriers to Affordable Housing.
"17 See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713
(N.J. 1975), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983).
118 336 A.2d at 724.
119 456 A.2d at 452-53.
120 The Fair Housing Act was upheld by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Hills
Development Co. v. Township of Bernards, 510 A.2d 621 (N.J. 1986).
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palities make "the achievement of the municipality's fair share of low
and moderate income housing realistically possible."12' The legislation
also permits a municipality to transfer up to one half of its fair share
housing obligation to another city or suburb if the two municipalities
consummate a "regional contribution agreement" establishing an
appropriate amount of compensation for the receiving jurisdiction.
The Fair Housing Act has eviscerated much of the impetus toward
suburban affordable housing embodied in the earlier Mount Laurel liti-
gation. Thus far, the Act has had a very limited impact in increasing
low income housing opportunities in the suburbs. 2 Only a fraction of
New Jersey municipalities have had fair share plans certified by
COAH. 23 Of the relatively small number of units built under the Act
most are either not affordable by low income households or are
reserved for the elderly. 12 4 In addition, the moratorium on the
builder's remedy took effect just as the housing market in New Jersey
was reaching its peak, thereby insulating municipalities from the possi-
bility that large amounts of housing would be constructed by private
developers. Finally, the ability of the suburbs to enter into regional
contribution agreements effectively changed the focus of the Mount
Laurel initiative from housing provision in the suburbs to housing reno-
vation and construction in the central cities.
Federal efforts to fight exclusionary land use practices in the suburbs
have also been few in number and largely unsuccessful. The most sig-
nificant effort was undertaken by George Romney, HUD secretary dur-
ing the early years of the Nixon Administration. 2 5  HUD's Open
Communities Program conditioned federal water and sewer assistance
grants to suburbs on their acceptance of subsidized housing. In addi-
tion, HUD sought legislation from Congress that would have prohib-
121 Certification of fair housing plans by COAH protects a municipality from lawsuit for a
period of six years. See NJ. Stat. Ann. § 52:27D-313 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991).
122 A number of municipalities have entered into regional contribution agreements,
however, transferring their obligations to central cities. See Hanley, supra note 116 (From
1988 to 1990, COAH approved 21 transfer programs.).
123 See 98 Towns Receive COAH Approval, 5 Council on Affordable Housing Newsletter 1
(1990) (As of May 16, 1990, COAH had certified the fair share plans of only 98 of New
Jersey's 567 municipalities.).
124 See Martha Lamar et al., Mount Laurel At Work: Affordable Housing in New Jersey:
1983-1988, 41 Rutgers L. Rev. 1197, 1214-15 (1989) (Survey of 54 municipalities shows that
2,830 units of housing have been completed, but most units affordable to low income
households are for the elderly.); Alan Sipress, Despite Ruling Affordable Homes Still Scarce
in N.J., Phil. Inquirer, Nov. 25, 1990, at I (Many communities are seeking to evade the Fair
Housing Act of 1985.).
125 A detailed description of Romney's efforts to promote low income housing in the
suburbs may be found in Danielson, supra note 111, at 213-42.
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ited local governments from using land use regulations to prevent "the
'reasonable' provision of federally-subsidized housing." 126 The pro-
gram soon engendered tremendous controversy from communities that
feared forced integration. President Nixon distanced himself from the
plan so as to avoid offending suburban whites, one of his most impor-
tant constituencies. 2 7 In the face of massive opposition, Romney
backed away from confrontation with the suburbs and strongly
endorsed local control over land use. 28 HUD's legislative proposal to
limit local zoning practices was defeated in Congress as were other con-
temporaneous bills to increase suburban low income housing
opportunities.129
B. The Relative Likelihood of Future Action by Congress and State
Legislatures to Remove Suburban Regulatory Barriers
Based upon past experience, one cannot be optimistic about the like-
lihood that either the Congress or state legislatures will take action to
limit the ability of suburbs to erect regulatory barriers to low and mod-
erate income housing. The primary problem facing efforts to pass leg-
islation at either the federal or state level is the intense opposition such
legislation is likely to evoke. As the 1990 Census demonstrates, the
proportion of this nation's population living in suburbs and non-metro-
politan areas now exceeds two thirds and is rapidly growing.' 3 A
majority of the population of even the most urbanized states can be
126 Id. at 222. The proposed legislation only applied to undeveloped communities in the
path of urbanization. Zoning would only have been subject to challenge if it were inconsistent
with a comprehensive plan for the area. See id.
127 At a news conference President Nixon stated, "[T]he kind of land use questions
involved in housing site selection are essentially local in nature: They represent the kind of
basic choices about the future shape of a community, or of a metropolitan area, that should be
chiefly for the people of that community or that area to determine." Id. at 229.
128 Id. at 225.
129 See id. at 236-39. The major piece of housing legislation passed by Congress during
the 1970s did contain the objectives of reducing "the isolation of income groups within
communities and geographical areas" and increasing the "spatial deconcentration of housing
opportunities for persons of lower income .. " Housing and Community Development Act
of 1974 § 101 (c)(6), Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633, 634-35 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 5301 (1985)). An amendment offered to prohibit suburbs from using local zoning to
impede the construction of subsidized housing constructed pursuant to the Act was shouted
down on the floor of the House of Representatives. See Danielson, supra note 11, at 242.
130 In 1990, over 46% of all Americans lived in suburbs and 22.5% lived in
nonmetropolitan areas. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census
Profile: Metropolitan Areas and Cities (No. 3, Sep. 1991).
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expected to oppose efforts that would take away their power to control
their communities. 1
3 1
Nevertheless, if legislation is to be enacted, the Commission is proba-
bly correct in assuming that action by the federal government is more
likely than action by state legislatures. The first reason has to do with
the composition of legislative districts in the Congress and state legisla-
tures. Congressional districts are much larger than most state legisla-
tive districts and more diverse. 3 2 Individual members of Congress are
therefore more likely to represent both urban and suburban voters than
are state legislators, which should reduce the intensity of opposition
among members of Congress to efforts to scale back suburban land use
barriers, at least as compared to state legislators.
More importantly, the role played by special interest groups in the
legislative process is likely to be different at the state and federal levels.
If the maintenance of suburban regulatory barriers is a majoritarian
preference,13 3 then the level of government most likely to override this
preference is the one at which the relevant interest groups in favor of
deregulation have the greatest power. Both theoretical and empirical
reasons support the belief that the interest groups most likely to be
proponents of eliminating restrictive suburban land use barriers would
be more successful in influencing members of Congress than state
legislators.
Narrowly-focused special interest groups have an advantage over dif-
fuse majorities in influencing government. 3 4 Individual voters who
favor a government policy that would benefit a large number of citizens
131 The following table shows that in 1980, even for the seven states with over 90% of their
population living in metropolitan areas, the proportion of the population living in the suburbs
far exceeded the proportion living in central cities.
State 7 in central city % in suburbs % in non-metro
California 38.6 56.7 4.7
Connecticut 35.2 56.8 8.0
Florida 31.4 59.8 8.8
Maryland 21.5 71.5 7.0
Massachusetts 34.9 61.2 3.9
New Jersey 16.8 83.2 0
Rhode Island 28.9 62.5 8.6
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, State and Metropolitan Area Data Book
363-501 (Table B) (1986); U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical
Abstract of the United States 1991 28 (Table 35) (1991).
132 See Malcolm E. Jewell, Representation in State Legislatures 95 (1982) ("[Sltate
legislative districts are smaller and more homogenous [than congressional districts], with
fewer conflicting interests.").
133 See supra text accompanying note 131.
134 See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups 53-65 (1965).
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often lack the incentive to organize and expend the resources necessary
to collect information and lobby public officials. Since the benefits can-
not be limited to those who invest in organization but instead must be
shared among a large number of citizens, each individual voter has an
incentive to leave the costly task of lobbying government to others and
free-ride on their efforts. Small groups of intensely-interested citizens,
however, have much lower organizational costs and are likely to have a
disproportionate effect on the legislative process. Special interest
groups favoring relaxed suburban land use regulations are likely to
enjoy particular advantages in influencing legislators at the federal
level."3 5 Since the cost of organizing diffuse suburban majorities is sig-
nificantly greater at the national as compared to the state level, the spe-
cial interest groups' organizational advantage would likely be magnified
at the federal level.
3 6
In the end, questions about the comparative strength of interest
groups at the state and federal levels cannot be answered purely on the
basis of theory. Interest group influence will vary depending upon the
subject matter of the regulation and the industry involved.' 7 Never-
theless, it appears that proponents of relaxing suburban land use barri-
ers are, indeed, more influential at the federal than the state level. The
special interest groups most likely to be involved in lobbying for dereg-
ulation are those that represent housing developers, low income ten-
ants, and civil rights groups. Each of these interest groups is, in
general, better organized and more influential at the federal than the
state level.' In addition, housing developers, represented by the
135 At the same time, special interest groups may be hindered at the federal level because
of the relatively higher level of visibility of Congressional deliberations as compared to state
legislative processes.
136 See E. Donald Elliot et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization
of Environmental Law, 1 J. L. Econ. & Org. 313, 329 (1985) (It is easier for environmental
groups to organize at the state level.); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process:
The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 341, 386 ("[T]he federal
government may be a more likely subject of capture by a set of special minoritarian interests,
precisely because the majority interest of the national constituency is so large, diffuse and
enormously difficult to organize."); cf. Ellickson, supra note 91, at 407 ("As governmental
complexity increases, majority sentiment on any single issue is less likely to prevail; organized
minorities become ever more able to engage in logrolling and to take advantage of majority
disorganization.").
137 See Schill, supra note 76, at 1317.
138 Interest groups representing housing developers and realtors are among the most
influential lobbies in Washington, D.C. See infra note 140. In addition, civil rights groups
such as the National Association For the Advancement of Colored People and the National
Urban League, have developed effective lobbying organizations in the nation's capital. See
Michael Pertschuk, Giant Killers 148-80 (1986) (describing successful efforts of Leadership
Conference on Civil Rights to pass the Voting Rights Act of 1981); Letter From Professor
Lani Guinier to the ABA Commission on Women in the Profession (Feb. 13, 1992)
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National Association of Homebuilders, are a particularly powerful
group in Washington139 and would almost certainly dominate the inter-
est groups that would lobby against legislation enacting the recommen-
dations of the Commission.
40
(describing legislative efforts of ElaineJones of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund). Surveys of
interest group influence on state legislators show that both real estate interests and civil rights
groups have modest levels of influence. See, e.g., Sarah M. Morehouse, State Politics, Parties
and Policy 108-112 (1981) (The real estate lobby is "significant" in only three states and civil
rights groups are not "significant" influences in any state.); Clive S. Thomas & Ronald J.
Hrebenar, Interest Groups in the States in Politics in the American States 123, 144 (Virginia
Gray et al., eds., 5th ed. 1990) (The number of states in which realtors' associations,
contractors/builders/developers and women/minority groups are ranked among the most
effective interest groups is 12, 8 and i, respectively.). These surveys also reveal that the
interest groups most likely to support local control over land use policies, local government
organizations, are more frequently influential than any of the above groups. See Morehouse,
supra, at 108-12 (Local government groups are influential in seven states.); Thomas &
Hrebenar, supra, at 144 (Local government organizations were ranked among the most
effective interest groups in 15 states.). See also Wayne L. Francis, A Profile of Legislator
Perceptions of Interest Group Behavior Relating to Legislative Issues in the States, 24 W. Pol.
Q. 702, 711-12 (1971) (In civil rights and land policy, interest groups exert relatively little
influence on state legislators.); Robert J. Nowell, One Thing We Did Right: Reflections On
The Movement, in New Directions in Civil Rights Studies 65, 74 (Armstead L. Robinson &
Patricia Sullivan eds., 1991) ("The work of the major [civil rights] organizations to influence
national policy overshadowed activism taking place at the local level .... The success of the
movement's national strategy taught activists that changes in race relations came swiftly and
completely when the federal government acted on their behalf.").
139 See, e.g., Carol B. Meeks, Housing 238 (1980) ("The NAHB is one of the largest and
most influential trade organizations in the country."); William Lilley, III, The Homebuilders'
Lobby, in Housing Urban America 32 (Jon Pynoos et al., eds., 2d ed. 1980) ("Government
officials and lobbyists close to the housing field regard NAHB as the most effective pressure
group concerned with housing and urban development, and one of the most effective in all
Washington."); Robert E. Mendelson, The More We Build, The More We Waste: Housing In
Older Urban Regions, in The Politics of Housing in Older Urban Areas 6, 18 (Robert E.
Mendelson & Michael A. Quinn eds., 1976) (NAHB is "one of the most effective lobbies in
Washington."). In 1986, the political action committees (PACs) of the National Association
of Homebuilders and the National Association of Realtors ranked among the ten largest PAC
contributors to members of Congress. SeeJames Q. Wilson, American Government 232 (4th
ed. 1989).
140 Opposition to efforts by Congress to encourage or coerce localities to remove land use
barriers is most likely to be voiced by members of the intergovernmental lobby such as the
National League of Cities, the Council of State Governments and the National Association of
Counties. See, e.g., Joint Hearing Report, supra note 29, at 117-22, 179-89 (1991) (In
prepared statements, representatives of the National Association of Counties and the National
League of Cities criticized the Commission's recommendations that the federal government
take actions to force municipalities to relax regulatory barriers.).
In recent years the intergovernmental lobby has lost significant strength. See Charles H.
Levine and James A. Thurber, Reagan and the Intergovernmental Lobby: Iron Triangles,
Cozy Subsystems, and Political Conflict, in Interest Group Politics 202, 216 (Allan J. Cigler &
Burdett A. Loomis eds., 2d ed. 1986) ("For the Big Seven [state and local government interest
groups] and their members, the cozy relationship they had enjoyed with the federal
government during the period of growth in domestic spending from the 1960s to the late
1970s came apart [in the 1980s].").
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CONCLUSION
Although efforts to relax suburban barriers to affordable housing are
more likely to be enacted by Congress than state legislatures, the inten-
sity of suburban opposition may well doom any legislative proposals at
either level of government. In developing its recommendations, the
Advisory Commission on Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing
faced a dilemma. As demonstrated in Part II, the Commission could
have advanced strategies such as direct preemption of land use regula-
tions, which, if enacted, probably would be more effective in removing
suburban barriers to affordable housing than its proposed strategy of
conditional grants. At the same time, however, such a recommendation
would have intensified suburban opposition, making the passage of any
barrier removal program all the more unlikely.
In the end, for the objective of affordable housing in the suburbs to
become a reality, suburban opposition must be diminished. Suburban
residents oppose low cost housing for myriad reasons ranging from a
reluctance to welcome households that do not pay their share of the
public services they consume to the fear of racial transition and declin-
ing property values. If the vision of racially and economically inte-
grated suburbs implicit in the recommendations of the Advisory
Commission on Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing is to
become a reality, it is likely that government must first act to allay the
fears of suburban residents and eliminate the sources of their opposi-
tion. Among the strategies the federal government can adopt is to take
over an even greater share of the cost of public services that have a
large redistributive component such as health care, housing, and spe-
cial education. Through increased intergovernmental grant-in-aid pro-
grams, suburban reliance on the property tax can be diminished. Race-
and class-conscious efforts to promote neighborhood stability and inte-
gration may also be necessary to gain the approval of suburban resi-
dents for increased affordable housing. 4 ' Although these initiatives
were well beyond the scope of the Commission, they may be a prereq-
uisite to the successful implementation of its recommendations.
141 These efforts might include limiting the amount of low income housing in any
particular community to a level acceptable to existing residents and affirmative marketing
practices to promote racial and economic diversity. See Schill, supra note 94, at -. Race- or
class-conscious integration of the suburbs might require an amendment to the Fair Housing
Act of 1968. See id. at -.
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